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The ability to plan for future events is one of the defining features of human
intelligence. Whether non-human animals can plan for specific future situ-
ations remains contentious: despite a sustained research effort over the last
two decades, there is still no consensus on this question. Here, we show
that New Caledonian crows can use tools to plan for specific future events.
Crows learned a temporal sequence where they were (a) shown a baited
apparatus, (b) 5 min later given a choice of five objects and (c) 10 min later
given access to the apparatus. At test, these crows were presented with one
of two tool–apparatus combinations. For each combination, the crows chose
the right tool for the right future task, while ignoring previously useful
tools and a low-value food item. This study establishes that planning for
specific future tool use can evolve via convergent evolution, given that corvids
and humans shared a common ancestor over 300million years ago, and offers
a route to mapping the planning capacities of animals.1. Background
Can non-human animals plan for specific future situations? Despite a sustained
research effort over the last two decades, there is still no consensus on this
question [1–15]. The ability to plan for future events is one of the defining
features of human intelligence [1,16,17]. The extent to which this ability is
unique to our species has been hotly debated for over two decades [1–9,18].
The main reason for this is that alternative explanations can account for the
reported animal successes. Consider the most prominent task, ‘the spoon test’
[17,19]: to pass the spoon test, the subject must select a tool for an event that
might happen in the future. Typically, there is a single choice from a number of
objects, ofwhich only one can be used to solve the problem. Both apes and corvids
have been shown to ignore distractor objects and instead choose the functional
object, thereby passing the test [2,6,8]. However, there have been concerns that
choices could be driven by the value of the target object in the present being
higher than those of the distractor objects, rather than by the animal imagining
the future utility of the tool [1,7,9,20–22]. These concerns have persisted despite
some attempts to address them or rule them out (e.g. [6,8,23,24]), and recently
received empirical support from a study on children [22]. After seeing a specific
problem, the children were presented with two objects that had high value.
One of these objects could be used to solve the observed problem, while the
other could not. Children under the age of five chose at chance between these
(a) (b) (c)
(d)
Figure 1. The three apparatuses used in the study: (a) dispenser apparatus,
(b) platform apparatus, (c) tube apparatus. (d) The tool presentation box,
including a stick, stone and hook as tools, apple as a lower-quality food
reward and a ball as a distractor object. The ball as a distractor was intro-
duced one day before the first presentation of the five-choice tool




2objects, despite clearly being able to remember which problem
they had observed. These results demonstrate that associative
learning can drive successful performance on the spoon test,
rather than the use of foresight, thereby substantiating the
possibility that previous spoon test studies may have reported
false positives for the presence of planning in animals.
Oneway to providemore compelling evidence of planning
would be to present animals with a more stringent test where
they have to choose between multiple tools after observing a
specific problem being set up, such that the same objects func-
tion as solution in one condition and as distractors in another
[7]. In this situation, each tool would have high value due to
it being associated with positive outcomes in the past, but
would only be useful when the correct problem was available
in the future. By varying the problem that will be available in
the future, it would be possible to see if an animal can
choose the correct tool for a particular anticipated task. Suc-
cessful solution of such tasks would demonstrate that an
animal is capable of planning for specific future tool problems.
Our study brought together researchers who have published
contrasting ‘rich’ and ‘lean’ interpretations of animal planning
studies to run a pre-registered version of such a test.0
2. Methods
The methodology has been described previously [25] and
was used in a similar way to test flexible planning in young
children [26].
(a) Subjects
New Caledonian crows were housed for 5 months in an outside
aviary on the island of Grand Terre, New Caledonia. Based on
the sexual size dimorphism [27] four of the nine crows were
females (Mercury, Neptune, Triton, Uranus) and five were male
(Io, Jupiter, Mars, Saturn, Venus). Based on the coloration of
their beaks, five of the crows were juveniles under one year of
age (Neptune, Triton, Jupiter, Mars, Venus) and four were adults
over 2 years of age (Mercury, Io, Saturn, Uranus). The aviary had
10 cages, each measuring at least 2 × 3 × 3 m. Access to water
was granted ad libitum. The general diet was fruits and soaked
dog food. Pieces of meat functioned as rewards during training
and testing. All testing took place in two compartments that
were visually inaccessible to each other and the other crows. Our
work was carried out under the approval of the University of
Auckland Animal Ethics Committee (reference no. 001823).
(i) Participation of individuals across trials
Nine individuals entered training. Three individuals (Jupiter,
Io, Mercury) did not reach criterion in the tool functionality
training and were therefore excluded from later procedures
and testing. Two crows were unable to make correct choices in
Conditions 1 and 2 (Mars, Venus). The remaining subjects
took on average 22 trials to reach training criterion. Four individ-
uals (Saturn, Neptune, Triton, Uranus), reached training criterion
at C1 and C2 and then entered the testing phase (C3 and C4)
and three individuals were tested in the follow-up (Neptune,
Triton, Uranus).
(b) Apparatus
We used three types of apparatus, namely a remote-controlled
feeder apparatus (the dispenser apparatus), a stone dropping
collapsible platform box (the platform apparatus) and a horizon-
tal Perspex tube (the tube apparatus). The dispenser apparatus
consisted of a wooden box 33 × 30 × 20 cm with a 6.3 × 3 cmslot in its top surface, into which the crow could insert items
(figure 1). It contained a disc, which turned when activated by
a remote-control button, dispensing one piece of food. Birds
were trained to drop a hook tool into the object slot to get
food. The platform apparatus was a 16 × 10 × 10 cm transparent
Perspex box of the same design as that used in past work on
physical cognition in corvids [28–31]. It had a collapsible trap-
platform within the box that released a food reward when a
stone was dropped onto it. To prevent stick tools from being
able to release this mechanism, we installed a 12 cm long tube
with a diameter of 5 cm and a slant of 30° in the middle.
Birds were trained to drop stones into this apparatus. The tube
apparatus was a horizontal Perspex tube, 18 cm long, with a
diameter of 5 cm, mounted 8 cm above a base. Birds had to
insert a wooden stick tool to push or pull the meat reward out
of the tube.
(c) Procedure
All birds participated in various experiments before the pre-
sented study [31–33]. The training specifically required for
the current study are tool use training, tool selection training,
apparatus functionality training, hook training and tool transport
training, five choice tool functionality training, and the temporal
sequence training, which is outlined in the description of
Conditions 1 and 2. For a detailed and complete description
of the prior experience and specific training stages, see below
and electronic supplementary material.
(i) Training phase
NewCaledonian crowswere first trained to use three tool-apparatus
combinations (stick to tube, stone to platform, hook to dispenser;
figure 1). We used two compartments; one in which the baited
apparatus was presented without the tool and one where the
choice between objects was presented (figure 2). Compartments
were directly adjacent to each other but did not allow visual access
to each other when the connecting door was closed.
Then birds were trained that a specific temporal sequence
would occur during the experiment (Conditions 1 and 2).
Conditions 1 and 2 were run with the tube apparatus. In Stage 1
they would be shown a baited apparatus for 1 min. After this,
the bird was moved to the next-door compartment and the con-
necting door was closed so the crows had no visual access to the
other compartment. After 5 min in this compartment, the birds








Figure 2. Compartment set-up. (a) The test compartments. The left compart-
ment contains a table, on which the tool presentation box was placed in the
choice phase. The right compartment contains a small table where the appar-
atus was placed at inspection phase and accession phase. Crows could move
between compartments when a sliding door was opened. Condition 1: crows
observe a tube baited with meat (C11) for 1 min, after which they are
moved to the left compartment. After 5 min, they are presented with the
three tools, a distractor and low value apple (C12). Once a choice has been
made the tool presentation box is removed. After 10 min the door to the
right compartment is opened, allowing the crows to access the food if they
have chosen the stick (C13). Condition 2: crows observe that the tube is
baited with low value apple (C21), and then are presented with the choice
of three tools, a distractor and meat (C22). Once a choice is made the presen-
tation box is removed, and after 10 min the crows are allowed access to the
apparatus (C23). Conditions 3 and 4: test conditions. Crows are given alternating
trials of C31–3 and C41–3, where they see the platform apparatus (C31) or the
dispenser apparatus (C41) baited with food, and then are moved to the next
door compartment, where, 5 min later, they are presented with the tool pres-
entation box containing three tools, a distractor and low value apple (C32 and
C42). To gain the meat the crows need to choose a stone in C32 and the hook in
C42, so they can take this tool to the apparatus in the next door compartment
10 min later (C33 and C43). We trained the birds in C1 and C2 to understand that
the specific future event will differ from the next one and that they have to be
attentive to the presented apparatus. This is one of the critiques of the study by
Kabadayi & Osvath [8]. Thus, the actual test is when birds have ‘learnt’ the tem-
poral rule and then in the test phase are presented with new apparatus–tool




3objects: a stick, a hook template, a stone, a distractor object and a
very small piece of apple (Stage 2). Positions of the objects with
the box were pseudorandomised across trials. After making a
choice, this apparatus was removed. Ten minutes later the door
was re-opened to the next-door compartment (Stage 3) and
given access to the baited apparatus they had observed in
Stage 1. Thus, birds were allowed to take the tool they had
chosen in Stage 2 to the apparatus.
To train the crows on this sequence of events, in Condition 1,
we placed highly valued meat in a long horizontal tube at
Stage 1, gave crows the choice of a stick, a hook, a rock, a distractor
object and lowly valued apple at Stage 2, and then gave crows
access to the meat-baited tube at Stage 3 (figure 2). The optimal
choice in Condition 1 at Stage 2was to take the stickwhile ignoring
the other objects, so it could be used 10 min later to get the meat
from the tube in Stage 3. In Condition 2, in contrast, we placed
low-value apple in the tube in Stage 1. Crows were then given
the choice of a stick, a hook, a rock, a distractor object and highly
valued meat at Stage 2, before being presented with the apple-
baited tube in Stage 3. The optimal choice in this condition was
to ignore the tools and take the meat during Stage 2, as the
crows could only get low-value apple in the future if they chose
the stick. Trials in which birds who chose meat in Stage 2 were
ended after the choice. Four of the six crows tested were able to
make correct choices in Conditions 1 and 2, with subjects taking
on average 22 trials to learn this. Birds received alternating trials
of Conditions 1 and 2 until they reached a criterion of 7/10 correct
trials for each of these conditions.
If the birds dropped or placed the tool within the aviary,
birds had to retrieve the tool from this location unless it was
out of reach. If the tool fell in a position the birds were not
able to retrieve, the tool was retrieved by the experimenter and
placed at the closest location to the place it fell that was again
reachable for the bird, which happened on 10 out of 167 trials
(also see table 3). In trials where birds did not choose a tool,
the trial was terminated and treated as a wrong choice. In any
cases where a wrong tool was chosen, the trial continued and
the crows were given the opportunity to interact with the tool
and the apparatus.
(ii) Testing phase
The critical part of our study was the test Conditions 3 and 4, in
which the crowswere presentedwith trials involving the same tem-
poral sequence. Testing conditions were identical to the training
phase except for the identity of the apparatus that was presented
at Stage 1. In training, this had always been the tube apparatus.
In Condition 3, we set up a drop-down platform apparatus
operated by a stone at Stage 1, meaning crows now had to
choose the stone in Stage 2 while ignoring the other objects
and the low-value apple in order to obtain the meat at Stage 3.
In Condition 4, we set up a dispensing apparatus operated by a
hook, meaning crows now had to choose the hook while ignoring
the other objects and the low-value apple. We chose apple as low-
value immediate reward based on a preference test conducted in a
previous study, inwhich they chose apple over tools [34]. Crucially
then, to get their preferred food item, the crows had to select a tool
appropriate for the apparatus they had reason to expect, through
their experience in the training conditions, would be available in
the future. They had never before experienced these test con-
ditions, and had to ignore the object that now had the highest
value, the stick, which had been associated more with food in
Conditions 1 and 2 than the other choices. The crows could only
take advantage of the future event that would occur 10 min later
in Stage 3 if they chose, at Stage 2, the specific tool required for
the apparatus that they had seen set up in Stage 1, and which cri-
tically, they had had no further visual access to. Each of the four
crows that passed Conditions 1 and 2 were given alternating
trials of Condition 3 and Condition 4 until they had received
Table 1. Performance of individuals. Mars and Venus did not pass criterion in Conditions 1 and 2.
individual correct total % CI− CI+ effect size binomial p
conditions 1 and 2 Mars 22 40 55 0.38 0.70 0.55 ≤0.001*
Venus 16 30 53 0.34 0.72 0.54 ≤0.001*
Neptune 17 20 85 0.62 0.97 1.33 ≤0.001*
Saturn 19 23 83 0.61 0.95 1.16 ≤0.001*
Triton 18 21 86 0.64 0.97 1.41 ≤0.001*
Uranus 19 25 76 0.55 0.91 0.83 ≤0.001*
conditions 3 and 4 Neptune 9 10 90 0.55 0.99 2.00 ≤0.001*
Saturn 3 10 30 0.07 0.65 0.29 0.429
Triton 7 10 70 0.35 0.93 0.67 ≤0.001*
Uranus 7 10 70 0.35 0.93 0.67 ≤0.001*
Table 2. Results of full generalized linear mixed model looking at learning effect in training and testing. When individuals that did not pass criterion in
Conditions 1 and 2 are excluded (n = 4) a significant training effect can be shown. With the two individuals (n = 6), no learning effect is present as the effect
trial is not significant and the base model without trial as fixed factor is not different from the model with trial included ( p≥ 0.05). St.E, standard error.
estimate St.E CI− CI+ z p
training n = 4 intercept 0.405 0.537 −0.646 1.457 0.756 0.449
trial 0.208 0.097 0.019 0.398 2.155 0.031
training n = 6 intercept 0.405 0.537 −0.646 1.457 2.426 0.015
trial 0.208 0.097 0.019 0.398 −0.003 0.998
testing n = 4 intercept 1.925 1.033 −0.100 3.950 1.863 0.062





five trials of each. To solve the task and get the food crows had
remember what apparatus they had seen 5 min ago during Stage
1 and then select the correct tool during Stage 2, while ignoring
the other functional tools, the distractor item and the low value
apple. It is important to note that in Conditions 3 and 4 crows
observed either a stone or hook apparatus, then 5 min later were
given a choice of five objects, and then 10 min later were given
access to the apparatus. Crows had never experienced this
sequence of temporal events with these objects. When choosing
objects, the crows only had the memory of what they had seen at
the observation Stage 1 to guide them. If crowswere using the rela-
tive value of each object, as predicted by an associative learning
account, in Conditions 3 and 4 crows should have chosen the
object most associated with past reward, namely the stick tool. If
subjects were choosing at chance we predicted they would
choose the correct object only 20% of the time, given there were
five objects to choose from. For a sample video, see [35].(d) Statistics
With a 0.2 chance level (choosing one correct object out of the five
offered) a bird needed to get five trials out of 10 correct to be above
chance at p < 0.05 (one-tailed p = 0.026) at test or six trials out of
10 correct to be above chance at p < 0.01 (one-tailed p = 0.005).
All statistical tests were conducted in R [36].3. Results
Four of the six crows tested showed performance above chance
and reached the criterion in Conditions 1 and 2, takingbetween 20 and 25 training trials to learn the temporal rule.
These four individuals were then tested in the critical test Con-
ditions 3 and 4, where novel tool-apparatus combinations
were presented (table 1). Three out of the four tested crows
performed significantly above chance across these Conditions
3 and 4, with one subject scoring 9/10 and two subjects scor-
ing 7/10 (binomial choice between five choices, p < 0.001).
Learning effects in training can be shown when individuals
Mars and Venus, which did not pass criterion in Conditions
1 and 2, are excluded (no learning effect when the two individ-
uals are included; table 2). No learning effect can be shown in
Conditions 3 and 4. Detailed performances of individuals are
presented in table 3.4. Discussion
These results provide evidence that New Caledonian crows
can plan for specific future tool use. Across Conditions 3
and 4, three of the four crows tested changed their object
choices depending on which apparatus they observed being
set up in Stage 1. Therefore, their performance was clearly
not based on a preference for a specific tool type but on
their observation of which problem they would have
available to them in the future.
Our studyalso shows thatNewCaledonian crows can learn
to use novel tools to prepare for specific anticipated events. That
is, the crows’ choices were made regarding tool behaviours













































































































































































































































































































































































5in this species’ repertoire of natural behaviours. Stone tool use
has not been observed in any wild New Caledonian crow
population, while hook tool use has been observed in other
populations [37], but not in the one these crows were sampled
from. Hook tool use in our study was also different from wild
New Caledonian crow hook use, as in our study it only
involved inserting a hook shaped stick into an automated
feeding machine, rather than using the hook functionally.
A potential limitation of the study was the low number of
individuals that were tested. Owing to the space and time
restrictions of the field season, it was not possible to include
more than nine individuals in this study, and only four of
nine individuals passed the initial training criterion. Interest-
ingly, all individuals that succeeded in the test Conditions 3
and 4 were female, of which, only the individual Uranus
was categorized as an adult.
These birds selected the correct tool even though the
distractors had been solutions in other conditions or items
that could have been more immediately rewarding (i.e. a
piece of apple or a ball). We note that the latter were not
selected by the birds in Conditions 1–6, even though they
had interacted with the ball during a familiarization phase
and apple was a daily diet food item, raising the concern
that theymay have learned to ignore these items over the train-
ing trials. However, even when conservatively reanalyzing the
results of Conditions 3 and 4 as if the crows had only been
offered three options rather than five (and so changing the
probability of choosing the correct object by chance from 20
to 33%), we obtain the same finding: three of the four crows
performed significantly above chance. Thus, our results are
robust to the possibility that the distractor objects did not
work as intended. Still, future studies might want to use two
different types of low-value food items; one for training and
a different one for testing or run a control where the distractor
is the optimal choice.
Finally, we cannot completely rule out that crows chose the
correct tool because of some kind of associative learning.Wedo
not think this possibility is likely, however, because the birds
were trained in C1 and C2 on a different apparatus combi-
nation than used during testing in C3 and C4, and we used
temporal gaps in our study: the tools were presented 5 min
after the presentation of the apparatus (when it was now out
of sight) and crows were then only able to gain reward (if
they had chosen the correct tool) 10 min after this. Further-
more, tools acted as the functional choice in one trial but as
distractor object in the next trial, so the birds could not succeed
by simply selectingwhatever tool wasmost recently associated
with reward. To strengthen the case further, future studies
could run control conditions where the apparatus is visibly
removed or destroyed after Stage 1, to examine if the birds
would continue to pick the now no longer functional tool, or
indicate their understanding by switching to the lower-value
apple option.
The crows in our study not only picked a tool that has pre-
viously turned out to be useful, but a tool that would be
useful for a specific future event. Therefore, New Caledonian
crows are a prime candidate for testing the conservative criteria
for mental time travel developed by Suddendorf & Corballis
[38], which children pass [39]. In addition to testing New
Caledonian crows to this standard, there is clearly far more
research to be done to understand precisely which cognitive
mechanisms underpin the crows’ behaviour, and what the





Given that corvids and humans shared a common ancestor
before 300 Ma our study suggests that planning for specific
future tool use can evolve via convergent evolution [42]. Our
results also establish a novel study design that could be used
effectively to test for future planning in other non-human ani-
mals as there is clear evidence that animals can pass this test.
Further, we have strived to reach some agreement between
researchers that have advanced ‘rich’ and ‘lean’ interpretations
on past data on the interpretation of such successful perform-
ances. Our paradigm therefore offers one potential route
towards mapping how planning abilities evolve.
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